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A DISPROPORTIONATE RULING FOR ALL 
THE RIGHT REASONS:  
BEIT SOURIK VILLAGE COUNCIL V.  
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n March 9, 2002, a Palestinian suicide bomber walked into Jeru-
salem’s popular Moment Café as though he was an ordinary cus-
tomer looking to order coffee or a snack.1 When he reached the center of 
the café, he detonated himself, killing eleven people.2 Three weeks later, 
during the Jewish holiday of Passover,3 twenty-five-year-old Abd al-
Basit Awdah, a Hamas4 activist, blew himself up in Netanya’s Park Hotel 
during a seder5 attended by 250 grandparents, mothers, fathers, and chil-
dren.6 Twenty-nine people lost their lives and 140 others were injured in 
the explosion.7 Since September 2000, there have been over eight hun-
                                                                                                             
 1. Lisa Katz, Most Deadly Terrorist Attacks in Israel, http://judaism.about.com/ 
library/1_terrorism/bl_worstattacks.htm. See also Etgar Lefkovits & David Rudge, 11 
Killed in Jerusalem Suicide Attack: Two Terrorists Open Fire at Netanya Hotel Killing 3, 
Wounding More than 50, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 10, 2002, at 1A, available at LEXIS, 
News Library Jpost File. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Passover is a spring festival celebrated by Jews lasting seven days in Israel and 
eight days in the Diaspora (lands outside of Israel). The holiday commemorates the Exo-
dus from Egypt. 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA Passover 163 (1972). 
 4. Hamas was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas has used various tactics, including political and violent, to 
reach their goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. “Hamas 
activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many 
attacks—including large-scale suicide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military 
targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Fatah rivals.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Back-
ground Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Released by the Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Oct. 8, 1999), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/ 
2801.htm#hamas. 
 5. Taking place on the first two nights of the eight day holiday of Passover, the se-
ders are the most important events in the Passover celebration. They are a time for fami-
lies to come together and recount the story of the Jews’ exodus from Egypt and their 
journey to Israel. The Passover Seder, http://www.holidays.net/passover/seder.html. 
 6. Human Rights Watch, Suicide Bombing Attacks on Civilians, http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-03.htm. See also David Rudge, 20 Die in Netanya 
Pessah Massacre, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News 
Library Jpost File. 
 7. Katz, supra note 1. 
O 
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dred such attacks in Israel, making terrorism in Israel both horrifying and 
commonplace.8 
As of March 2006, more than 3,800 Israelis and Palestinians have died 
and over 21,0009 have been injured during the second Intifada10—a po-
tent reminder that the peace process that once seemed so promising has 
crumbled.11 From an Israeli perspective, no place is secure from the 
                                                                                                             
 8. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [2004] 
P.D. 46(2) ¶ 1, available at http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html. 
 9. See Middle East Policy Council, Conflict Statistics, http://mepc.org/resources/ 
mrates.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (stating that 999 Israelis and 3844 Palestinians have 
lost their lives); see also Maj. Gen. Uzi Dayan, Special Policy Forum Report—In Defense 
of the Fence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Peacewatch, No. 437 (Dec. 19, 
2003), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch 
2003/437.htm. 
 10. Intifada literally means uprising. The first Intifada spanned six years beginning in 
December 1987 and continuing until September 1993 (the signing of the Oslo Accord). 
This period was marked by continuous Palestinian uprisings, including rioting, rock 
throwing, and illegal road blocks in an effort to contest Israel’s presence in Gaza and the 
West Bank. See generally CAPTAIN (RES.) UZI AMIT-KOHN ET AL., ISRAEL, THE 
“INTIFADA” AND THE RULE OF LAW 27–28 (1993). The second Intifada, like the first, also 
began with rock throwing. While some argue that it was caused by Ariel Sharon’s con-
troversial visit to the Temple Mount—a holy site shared by both Jews and Muslims 
where Abraham was to sacrifice Isaac and Mohammad is thought to have ascended to 
heaven—others believe that Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian Prime Minister, planned to call 
for an uprising regardless of Sharon’s actions. Since September 2000 until the present, 
this latest Intifada has exploded into a full blown guerilla war of suicide bombers and 
military incursions. Ziv Hellman, The Beginnings of the Second Intifada: In September 
2000, a New Wave of Violence Erupted, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/history_ 
community/Israel/Overview_IsraeliPalestinian_Relations/Intifada_I/Intifada2.htm. 
 11. See David Makovsky, How to Build a Fence, 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50, 50 (2004). 
Chief Justice Aharon Barak provides a brief history of the Israeli Palestinian peace proc-
ess in Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel. He states: 
Since 1967, Israel has been holding the areas of Judea and Samaria in belliger-
ent occupation. In 1993 Israel began a political process with the PLO, and 
signed a number of agreements transferring control over parts of the area to the 
Palestinian Authority. Israel and the PLO continued political negotiations in an 
attempt to solve the remaining problems. The negotiations, whose final stages 
took place at Camp David in Maryland, USA, failed in July 2000 . . . a short 
time after the failure of the Camp David talks, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
reached new heights of violence . . . . In September 2000, the Palestinian side 
began a campaign of terror against Israel and Israelis. Terror attacks take place 
both in the area [Judea and Samaria] and in Israel. From September 2000 until 
the beginning of April 2004, more than 780 attacks were carried out within Is-
rael. During the same period, more than 8200 attacks were carried out in the 
area. 
Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. 
2006] BEIT SOURIK VILLAGE COUNCIL 859 
threat of attack: “in public transportation, in shopping centers and mar-
kets, in coffee houses and in restaurants,” Israeli citizens struggle with 
the perpetual fear of terrorism.12 Homemade bombs filled with nails and 
shrapnel, snipers overlooking highways and small communities, and 
Qassam rockets13 fill the thoughts of parents daily as they send their 
children to school or kiss one another goodbye on their way to work.14 
In the past, Israel responded to terrorist threats in several ways, most 
notably through military incursions into the Occupied Territories.15 In 
2002 alone, the Israeli Defense Force16 carried out two large-scale mili-
tary operations between March and June, operation “Defensive Wall”17 
                                                                                                             
 12. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2; see also Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democ-
racy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the 
National Interest—The Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 28 (2004) (“Since its 
establishment, the State of Israel has been subject to incessant terrorist attacks. Streets, 
buses, and places of mass entertainment transformed in the blink of an eye into fields of 
death is not the scene of a nightmare but a daily reality. The cost of terrorism is unbear-
able. The lives of thousands of innocent civilians have been brutally cut short, and the 
existence of tens of thousands of injured men and women has been changed unrecogniza-
bly; the Israeli experience is suffused with bereavement, pain, frustration and anger. Cop-
ing with the constant fear of imminent terrorist attacks imprints its own indelible mark on 
every aspect of daily life, political, cultural, social and economic.”). 
 13. “The Qassam-1 and Qassam-2 are rockets that were developed by the Islamic 
terrorist group Hamas in the Gaza Strip with the aid of the Palestinian Authority (PA)      
. . . .”  Mara Karlin, Palestinian Qassam Rockets Pose New Threat to Israel, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ Qassam.html. 
 14. See Michael Nakoryakov, Terrorism Will End One Day—It Just Has to Run Out 
of Excuses, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 12, 2003, at AA5. 
 15. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. This Note refers to the Israel-occupied regions by 
the names that are most commonly used in the international debate: “West Bank,” “Gaza 
Strip,” or “the Occupied Territories.”  The biblical terms “Judea” and “Samaria”—as the 
West Bank is officially called in Israel—are used as they appear in quoted texts or in 
formal titles. This Note uses the terms “occupied territories,” “military government,” 
“occupying power,” and “occupant” as they are normally used in international law. Dan 
Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 1 n.1 (1994). Although somewhat geographically ambiguous, the West Bank consti-
tutes the “area west of the Jordan River taken over by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War.”  
AMIT-KOHN ET AL., supra note 10, at 24. 
 16. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is one of the most elite forces in the world. In 
Israel, enrollment in the IDF is mandatory for both men and women. The IDF is highly 
regarded in Israel and commands great respect. See 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 690 
(1972). 
 17. Justice Barak described Operation Defensive Wall as follows: 
Within the framework of Operation Defensive wall, the army carried out a 
wide-ranging operation of detention. The IDF entered Palestinian cities and vil-
lages and detained many suspects. At the height of the activity about 6000 peo-
ple were detained . . . . During the first stage of these detentions, the detainees 
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and operation “Determined Path.”18 Despite the commitment of signifi-
cant resources and effort, the terrorist attacks, although reduced, have not 
ceased. 
In April 2002, the Ministers’ Committee for National Security, a 
Committee under the Minister of Defense,19 reached a decision to build a 
security fence20 between Israel and the West Bank for the stated purpose 
                                                                                                             
were brought to temporary facilities, which were set up at brigade headquarters. 
Here the detainees were initially screened, a process whose duration extended 
between a few hours and two days. At this point, a substantial number of the 
detainees were released. During the second stage, those who remained were 
transferred to a central detention facility in the area, located at Ofer Camp, for 
further investigation. 
HCJ 3278/02 Center for Defense of the Individual v. IDF Commander [2002] ¶ 2 (unpub-
lished). 
 18. Operation Determined Path has been described as follows: 
As part of this operation, which was initiated at the end of March 2002, the IDF 
forces entered various areas of Judea and Samaria. Their intention was to detain 
wanted persons as well as members of several terrorist organizations . . . . 
Among those detained were persons who were not associated with terrorism; 
some of these persons were released after a short period of time. 
HJC 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002] ¶ 1 (unpublished); see 
also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. 
 19. The Ministers’ Committee for National Security works directly with the Prime 
Minister to discuss and establish national security policy. See Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministers’ Committees, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa. The Minister of Defense 
“heads and operates the defense system. The minister is aided by assistants, advisors, and 
a staff directly subordinate to him. These units are responsible for coordination of opera-
tions in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District, the emergency economic system, internal 
auditing of the defense system, Youth and Nahal, soldiers’ ombudsman, rural settlement 
affairs, and infrastructure.”  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1999/8/Ministry+of+Defense.htm 
[hereinafter MFA]. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for overseeing the construc-
tion of the security fence. Id. 
 20. This Note will refer to the fence predominantly as the “security fence” or as the 
“fence.” However, the fence is not always referred to as a “security fence.” In Beit 
Sourik, the Court refers to the fence as a “separation barrier,” a “separation fence,” and as 
a “wall.”  Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶¶ 6, 7, 43. When referred to in a derogatory manner, 
the fence is called an “apartheid fence” and as an “annexation barrier.” International 
Solidarity Movement, Archive for the ‘Beit Sira’ Category, http://www.palsolidarity.org/ 
main/category/beit-sira/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). As Nir Keida surmises: 
All these terms refer to a physical barrier, normally 50–60 meters wide, which 
when completed should span approximately 720 km. The barrier comprises of a 
3 meter high electronic warning fence, barbed wire, a ditch on the Eastern side, 
a patrol road, and a fine-sand path to detect intrusions. In only 3% of its path 
2006] BEIT SOURIK VILLAGE COUNCIL 861 
of “improv[ing] and strengthen[ing] operational capability in the frame-
work of fighting terror, and to prevent the penetration of terrorists from 
the area of Judea and Samaria into Israel.”21 This pronouncement came 
under severe scrutiny and opposition from the international community.22 
                                                                                                             
will the Separation Barrier comprise of a physical wall, mostly where there is 
risk of sniper rifle against Israeli highways. 
Nir Keida, An Examination of the Authority of the Military Commander to Requisition 
Privately Owned Land for the Construction of the Separation Barrier, 38 ISR. L. REV. 
247, 248 n.2 (2005). 
 21. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. 
 22. See generally Anti-Defamation League, Arab Media Review: Anti-Semitism and 
Other Trends February–March 2004—Focus: Israel’s Security Fence (depicting Arab 
reaction to the fence and cartoons that have appeared in newspapers around the world 
damning Israel’s decision to build the fence), http://www.adl.org/Anti_semitism/arab/ 
as_arabmedia_05_04/asam_fence_05_04.asp (May 11, 2004). On July 11, 2004, the In-
ternational Court of Justice in The Hague ruled that the security fence was built illegally 
and must be dismantled. The “ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and its deci-
sion . . . constitutes a non-binding advisory opinion rendered at the request of the UN 
General Assembly.”  Yuval Shany, Examination of Issues of Substantive Law: Capacities 
and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases, 38 ISR. L. REV. 230, 231 
(2005). Israel, along with several other countries including the United States, ignored the 
Court’s ruling and felt that the Court did not have jurisdiction in this matter. Many in the 
academic community rejected the ICJ’s opinion as well. Alan Dershowitz, a professor of 
law at Harvard, wrote: 
The International Court of Justice is much like a Mississippi court in the 1930s. 
The all-white Mississippi court, which excluded blacks from serving on it, 
could do justice in disputes between whites, but it was incapable of doing jus-
tice in cases between a white and a black. It would always favor white litigants. 
So, too, the International Court. It is perfectly capable of resolving disputes be-
tween Sweden and Norway, but it is incapable of doing justice where Israel is 
involved, because Israel is the excluded black when it comes to that court—
indeed when it comes to most United Nations organs. 
Alan Dershowitz, Israel Follows its Own Law, Not Bigoted Hague Decision, JERUSALEM 
POST, July 11, 2004, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library Jpost File. While Israel was 
not bound by the ICJ opinion, there exist both similarities between the ICJ’s advisory 
opinion and the HCJ’s holding in Beit Sourik, as well as many differences. In his intro-
duction to the Israel Law Review’s double issue pertaining strictly to issues involving the 
security fence, David Kretzmer asserted that the most important similarities between the 
two opinions are that: 
[B]oth courts found that construction of the barrier on the route under review 
was incompatible with international law (albeit that the Supreme Court decision 
refers only to one specific segment of the barrier). However, the differences be-
tween the two opinions are more striking than their similarities. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court ignored the legal status of the Israeli settlements on 
the West Bank, and even regarded protecting the residents of these settlements 
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Like so many of Israel’s other policies concerning the Occupied Territo-
ries, the building of the fence has had a polarizing effect.23 On the one 
hand, many Israelis, scholars, and military officials postulate that Israel 
should do whatever it takes to secure its borders and to ensure the safety 
of its citizens, while on the other hand, there are those, primarily human 
rights activists and scholars, who believe that any action Israel takes in 
conjunction with the Palestinians constitutes a human rights violation.24 
                                                                                                             
as a legitimate security interest of the military commander. The ICJ discussed 
the legal status of the settlements, stated that they had been established in viola-
tion of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and opined that their il-
legality under international law meant that the barrier surrounding them was 
unlawfully constructed. The Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of 
the concrete facts relating to the segment of the barrier under review. The ICJ 
opinion is based on a series of generalities and a partial, it would seem, inaccu-
rate description of the facts. Lack of any rigorous examination of the facts or of 
specific segments of the barrier is conspicuous by its absence in the Advisory 
Opinion. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the barrier could not be 
built on the eastern side of the Green Line, if security considerations favored 
such a route. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion is the assumption that any bar-
rier to protect people in Israel from terrorist attacks arising from the West Bank 
should be built on the Israeli side of the Green Line. 
David Kretzmer, Introduction, 38 ISR. L. REV. 6, 10–11 (2005). A copy of the ICJ’s opin-
ion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory Advisory Opinion, is available at www.icj-cij.org. 
 23. See Tovah Lazaroff & Dan Izenberg, PM Accepts Ruling, JERUSALEM POST, July 
2, 2004, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library Jpost File. See also Jonathan Grebinar, 
Responding to Terrorism: How Must a Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and 
American Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 261 (2003) (“As democracies, the United States 
and Israel are subject to a great deal of criticism with respect to legislation used to com-
bat terrorism. Responding to terrorism, a question often arises regarding the measures 
that a democratic state may legally apply in order to effectively protect its citizens and 
yet continue to honor human rights.”); but see Caroline B. Glick, Without Prejudice, 
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library Jpost File. 
 24. Arguments against Israel’s treatment of human rights focus primarily on its mili-
tary. Emanuel Gross, Democracy’s Struggle Against Terrorism: The Powers of Military 
Commanders to Decide Upon the Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of Curfews, 
Blockades, Encirclements and Declaration of an Area as a Closed Military Area, 30 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 201 (2002) (“Opponents of Israeli actions involving the demoli-
tion of houses, point out the danger involved in granting discretionary powers to the mili-
tary commander, who will tend to see a ‘military necessity’ in situations where no such 
necessity exists.”); see generally International Solidarity Movement, Archive for the 
‘Beit Sira’ Category, http://www.palsolidarity.org/main/category/beit-sira/ (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2006) (referring to the security fence as the “annexation barrier” and the “Israeli 
Apartheid Wall”); see also Simon, supra note 15, at 26 n.128 (“The Military Govern-
ment’s policies are frequently criticized as violating Palestinian human rights by the Jew-
ish and Arab political parties on the left of the political spectrum, as well as by various 
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These differing views were magnified in early February 2004 when Is-
raeli bulldozers and construction workers entered the areas surrounding 
the impoverished village of Beit Sourik to begin building the security 
fence.25 For the people of Beit Sourik, the security fence represented the 
casting of a shadow over their rights.26 In an interview, Village Council 
Chairman Muhammad Khaled Kandil stated that the construction of the 
fence was a sign that 
[The Israeli] Army [was going to] cut us off from our livelihood and 
surround the village with a wall. We’ll be denied access to 6,500 du-
nams27 of our land. This is a quiet village that has never been under 
curfew, yet soon we will be in a prison. We’ll be left to die.28 
                                                                                                             
non-governmental organizations including B’Tselem, Amnesty International, Middle East 
Watch, the ICRC, UNRWA, and the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights.”). 
 25. Daniel Ben-Tal, It Takes a Village, JERUSALEM POST, June 11, 2004, at 11, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library Jpost File. While Beit Sourik is the primary village dis-
cussed in this case, “the petition, as originally worded, attacked the orders of seizure 
regarding lands in the villages of Beit Sourik, Bidu, El Kabiba, Katane, Beit A’anan, Beit 
Likia, Beit Ajaza and Beit Daku.” Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 9. In describing where 
these villages are geographically located, the Court stated that “[t]hese lands are adjacent 
to the towns of Mevo Choron, Har Adar, Mevasseret Zion, and the Jerusalem neighbor-
hoods of Ramot and Giv’at Zeev, which are located west and northwest of Jerusalem.” 
Id. The Court further described the petitioners as “the landowners and the village councils 
affected by the orders of seizure. They argue that the orders of seizure are illegal. As 
such, they should be voided or the location of the separation fence should be changed. 
The injury to petitioners, they argue, is severe and unbearable.” Id. 
 26. See id. See also Ruth Wedgwood, Whitepapers on The International Court of 
Justice and the Israeli “Fence,” General Assembly Referral on “Legal Consequence of 
the Construction Of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (Feb. 23, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id= 
212024. 
 27. One dunam equals one thousand square miles which equals 0.25 acre. 
 28. Ben-Tal, supra note 25. The petitioners further argue that their injuries are both 
severe and unbearable. Over 42,000 dunams of their lands are affected. The ob-
stacle itself passes over 4,850 dunams, and will separate between petitioners 
and more than 37,000 dunams, 26,500 of which are agricultural lands that have 
been cultivated for many generations. Access to these agricultural lands will 
become difficult and even impossible . . . . Use of local water wells will not be 
possible. As such, access to water for crops will be hindered. Shepherding, 
which depends on access to these wells, will be made difficult. Tens of thou-
sands of olive and fruit trees will be uprooted. The fence will separate villages 
from tens of thousands of additional trees. The livelihood of many hundreds of 
Palestinian families, based on agriculture, will be critically injured. The separa-
tion fence will harm the villages’ ability to develop and expand. 
Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 9. Muhammad Khaled Kandil’s reference to a curfew is 
surely meant to imply that his village has never been associated with suicide bombers or 
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To rectify what they felt was a stripping of their rights as humans, the 
villagers and councilmen of Beit Sourik sought the Israeli Supreme 
Court’s assistance in stopping what they felt was an illegal construction 
of a fence.29 
On a larger scale, Palestinians argue that the “wall” restricts their free-
dom of movement, disrupts their everyday lives, and causes them to lose 
land and their livelihood.30 It is further argued that the placement of the 
fence, and even the fence itself, are clear indications that Israel is setting 
permanent borders31 and thus illegally annexing the land.32 These are 
legitimate and real concerns, magnified by the growing belief that the 
peace process between Israel and the Palestinians is indefinitely stalled.33 
On June 30, 2004, in Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of 
Israel, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice,34 
                                                                                                             
troublemakers since curfews are often imposed in such areas during times of heightened 
security. Ben-Tal, supra note 25. 
 29. See id. See also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. 
 30. Wedgwood, supra note 26. 
 31. The argument made by the Palestinians centers on the belief that because the se-
curity fence does not pass along Israel’s border, but instead through areas of the West 
Bank, Israel is trying to annex areas of Israel in violation of international law. See Beit 
Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 10; but see Makovsky, supra note 11, at 51 (“A properly con-
structed fence could achieve multiple objectives: reduce violence by limiting the infiltra-
tion of suicide bombers into Israel, short-circuit the deadlock on achieving a two-state 
solution, advance the debate in Israel about the future of most settlements, and perhaps 
even provide an incentive for Palestinians to return to the negotiating table. Even without 
negotiation, the fence would function as a provisional border and could be modified in 
the future if Palestinians make real progress in halting terrorism against Israel and agree 
to restart talks.”). 
 32. Wedgwood, supra note 26. 
 33. See generally Yorman Dinstein, Whither the Peace Process?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 
237 (1996); see also Makovsky, supra note 11; Gross, supra note 24. 
 34. Depending on the type of case before the Court, the Supreme Court also functions 
as the High Court of Justice. This dual role 
is unique to the Israeli system because as the High Court of Justice, the Su-
preme Court acts as a court of first and last instance. The High Court of Justice 
exercises judicial review over the other branches of government, and has pow-
ers “in matters in which it considers it necessary to grant relief in the interests 
of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribu-
nal.” As the High Court of Justice, the Supreme Court hears over a thousand 
petitions each year. Often these cases are high-profile ones challenging acts of 
top government officials. Through its jurisdiction as a High Court of Justice, 
the Supreme Court upholds the rule of law and strengthens human rights. 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Judiciary: The Court System, http://www.mfa. 
gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches%20of%20Government/Judicial/The%20Judiciary-
%20The%20Court%20System (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter MFA, The Judici-
2006] BEIT SOURIK VILLAGE COUNCIL 865 
delivered a landmark judgment that attempted to quell international ani-
mosity and solve the political divide that plagued the State of Israel in its 
decision to erect a security fence. The ruling was made with the intention 
of striking the proper balance between the security needs of Israel and 
the human rights of Palestinians.35 The Court ruled that the overarching 
motivation for building the fence was for security and not political pur-
poses, and as a result, that the State of Israel was permitted to build the 
fence. However, the Court additionally held that the fence’s route, as 
chosen by the Ministry of Defense, did not properly balance the security 
needs of Israel against the fence’s adverse affect on the Palestinians’ 
quality of life.36 Consequently, the Court ruled that certain portions of the 
fence were illegal. In coming to this conclusion, the Court used the pro-
portionality test,37 which deals with the “balance between the realization 
of the declared purpose and the extent to which fundamental rights are 
infringed,” as well as with the “logical and empirical connections be-
tween the declared purpose and the means chosen.”38 This particular 
                                                                                                             
ary]. From this point forward, this Note will refer to the “Supreme Court” and the “High 
Court of Justice” interchangeably despite their separate functions as is commonly done in 
legal articles. 
 35. Dan Izenberg, High Court to Hear Fence Petitions, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 17, 
2004, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library Jpost File. 
 36. See Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 67. 
 37. Courts have generally adopted two definitions of proportionality, and even then 
several Justices continue to disagree on its proper meaning. One definition commonly 
used is that proportionality is a form of review to determine if the administrative author-
ity in question “chose the method of obtaining its goal that causes the minimal injury to 
individuals.” Marcia Gelpe, Constraints on Supreme Court Authority in Israel and the 
United States: Phenomenal Cosmic Powers; Itty Bitty Living Space, 13 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 493, 525 (1999). This test focuses on the “means chosen by the authority, and not to 
its goals.” Id. A comparison has been made to “American law for determining the validity 
of statutory classifications that interfere with fundamental rights. Under American law, 
such a classification is valid only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a very important 
state interest.”  Id. at 526. Justices also define proportionality as: 
Determination of whether the means chosen will reach the goal, whether they 
will do so with the least possible injury to individuals, and whether there is an 
appropriate relationship between the utility of the administrative action and the 
injury it causes . . . . This test allows the Court to perform not only a cost-
benefit analysis of the administrative action . . . but also . . . ask whether any 
incremental action designed to achieve a greater good justifies the incremental 
injury it causes. 
Id. at 525–26. 
 38. Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive Meanings of Proportional-
ity in the Supreme Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38 ISR. L. REV. 262, 
263 (2005). 
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judgment has continuing implications as Supreme Court President 
Aharaon Barak39 plans to use this petition “as a model for establishing 
guidelines for handling all the petitions which challenge sections of the 
security fence in different parts of the country.”40 As a result of the Su-
preme Court’s judgment, Israel was compelled to reconsider the path of 
various segments of the fence all over the country.41 
Part II of this Note briefly explains the role of the Israeli Supreme 
Court and reviews the legal structure of the territories. In addition, it ex-
amines the High Court’s authority to review administrative actions and 
how military activities fit within that authority. Finally, it surveys the 
role military orders play in the territories. Part III analyzes the propor-
tionality test used by the Court in its attempt to balance the goals of the 
military against the rights of the petitioners. Part IV provides background 
concerning the construction of the security fence and the purported rea-
sons for its erection. Part V of this Note is separated into two parts. First 
it examines the Court’s recent treatment of military orders, specifically 
the order to build the fence. Second, this section argues that the Court 
failed to provide the government and the military the proper deference 
necessary when reviewing the unique decision to build a fence. This 
Note concludes that while the Court’s ruling helped to ease international 
concern regarding the negative effects the fence will pose to Palestinians, 
it ultimately detracted from the democratic process of the State of Israel 
                                                                                                             
 39. Aharaon Barak is the sitting President of the Supreme Court of Israel and the 
author of the opinion in Beit Sourik. 
 40. Izenberg, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that the Court focused heavily on the princi-
ple that the barrier “should not encroach on Palestinian homes or cut farmers off from 
their land.”  In all, this particular ruling directly canceled thirty kilometers of a forty 
kilometer section of the barrier between Maccabim and Givat Ze’ev, on Jerusalem’s 
northwest outskirts). In fact, the High Court relied heavily on its decision in Beit Sourik 
when determining whether a portion of the security fence, which “[p]ursuant the military 
commander’s orders . . . was built, surrounding [Alfei Menashe, an Israeli town in the 
Samaria area] . . . from all sides, and leaving a passage containing a road connecting the 
town to Israel,” was proportional to the military’s stated purpose of security needs in 
Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister 
of Israel [2005] IsrSC ¶ 1. Sticking closely to its ruling in Beit Sourik, the Court deter-
mined that Israeli government and military must, “within a reasonable period, reconsider 
the various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while examining 
security alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the 
enclave to a lesser extent.” Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 116. 
 41. See id. See generally Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem 
of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terror-
ists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 721 (2001). 
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by improperly applying a test in an effort to influence military policy 
meant to be decided by other branches of the government.42 
II. THE ISRAELI LEGAL STRUCTURE 
Before examining the Court’s handling of Beit Sourik Village Council 
v. The Government of Israel, it is essential to clarify the legal system in 
the Occupied Territories. 43 This section will first explain the role and 
structure of the Supreme Court of Israel within the Occupied Territories. 
Next, this section will discuss the prevailing law in the West Bank and 
Gaza as stipulated by international law and as applied by the State of Is-
rael. Finally, this section will examine the development of the military 
commander’s power to implement policies that affect the fundamental 
safety of Israeli citizens as well as the nature of the Court’s ability to re-
view these policies. 
A. Supreme Court of Israel 
Similar to other States’ judicial systems, the Supreme Court of Israel is 
the highest judicial tribunal and the court of last resort in Israel.44 The 
Court is composed of fourteen justices with each case being overseen by 
three or more.45 The Israeli Supreme Court is consistently recognized as 
a just, honorable, and able institution.46 The Court has played a large role 
in forming Israeli civil liberties and shaping the rights of individuals—
                                                                                                             
 42. The purpose of this Note is not to belittle or undermine the competency of the 
Supreme Court of Israel—a Court whose Justices and holdings are held in the highest 
regard across the international legal community. Simon, supra note 15, at 22. Nor is this 
Note going to argue that the Court, and specifically Aharaon Barak, had anything but the 
best intentions in determining that the security fence was disproportionately damaging to 
the Palestinians. In addition, this Note will not dispute the need for judicial safeguards to 
military actions under certain circumstances. This Note will conclude that it is the gov-
ernment’s role to make security decisions, and that the Court’s aggressive attempt to ease 
international criticism of the fence by circumventing the policy of the State for its own 
undermines the very democratic values it so desperately tries to celebrate. Additionally, 
the author recognizes the strong argument to be made that without judicial review of 
military decisions the rights of Palestinians and even many Israelis would be threatened 
without any mechanism to protect them. However, the Note does not pose that the High 
Court should not hear cases involving military decisions, but rather that such decisions 
should be given true deference, and not a mere illusion to deference. 
 43. See generally Simon, supra note 15, at 18. 
 44. Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses as a Punitive Measure: 
Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871, 880 
(2003). 
 45. MFA, The Judiciary, supra note 34. 
 46. See Simon, supra note 15, at 22. 
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both within Israel and the Occupied Territories.47 In order to do so, how-
ever, the Court first needed to expand its ability to make such deci-
sions.48 The Court accomplished this judicial expansion49 primarily while 
acting in its second role as the Land’s High Court of Justice.50 In this 
role, the Court rules over institutions and people conducting public func-
tions prescribed by the law, as well as matters involving government de-
cisions.51 
It is primarily in the capacity as the High Court of Justice that it has 
“achieved prominence in the Israeli political system, and it is in this role 
that it exercises review over actions of the authorities in the Occupied 
                                                                                                             
 47. Israel’s recognition of civil liberties has been described as follows: 
Before 1992, Israel had no Basic Laws defining individual human rights. Dur-
ing this period, the Israeli Supreme Court identified numerous individual rights 
that it found worthy of special protection. The Court called these rights ‘basic 
values’ or ‘principles of the constitutional structure of our country.’ The Court 
found such norms in various sources: Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the democratic nature 
of the State, the inherent nature of man, considerations of justice and decency, 
‘the legacy of all advanced and enlightened states,’ and ‘the democratic free-
dom-loving character of our State.’ These rights so identified include the fol-
lowing: gender equality, equality on the basis of nationality, presumption of in-
nocence, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, 
privacy, dignity of man, freedom of property, integrity of the body, judicial in-
tegrity, freedom to strike, freedom of demonstration, freedom of conscience, 
and freedom of occupation. The Israeli Supreme Court created, or recognized, 
these values and rights through a process that American jurists might call con-
stitutional common law. The Court itself referred to such rights as those ‘not 
recorded in texts.’ Similarly, the Court, through case law, established the prin-
ciples of separation of powers and checks and balances. 
Gelpe, supra note 37, at 506–08. 
 48. Because Israel does not have a written constitution, the Supreme Court has paved 
the way for what is referred to as a “judicial bill of rights.”  Zaharah Markoe, Expressing 
Oneself Without a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L COMP. L. 319, 323 
(2000); Gelpe, supra note 37, at 493. 
 49. By “judicial expansion,” this Note refers to the apparent willingness of the Israeli 
Supreme Court to expand its ability to review and adjudicate on matters that in the past 
were considered by the Court to be outside of their expertise. 
 50. MFA, The Judiciary, supra note 34; see also DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION 
OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 10 (2002) 
(“It is mainly in the [role as the High Court] that the Court has achieved prominence in 
the Israeli political system, and it is in this role that it exercises review over actions of the 
authorities in the Occupied Territories.”). 
 51. The Israeli Supreme Court website (English version), Judicial Authority, 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/system/index.htm. 
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Territories.”52 The Court’s jurisdiction over public functions has pro-
vided the legal basis for its review in various spheres,53 including all de-
cisions and actions made by the military government in the Occupied 
Territories.54 In fact, the Court has asserted original jurisdiction over 
“virtually every power exercised by the branches of government,55 and is 
competent to order them to perform or refrain from performing any ac-
tion.”56 This includes the ability to grant occupants of the territories re-
quests to be heard by the Court.57 The Court’s willingness to allow Pales-
tinians to bring actions against the military government is considered by 
some to be unprecedented in similar situations.58 
                                                                                                             
 52. See id. Captain Uzi Amit-Kohn provides an interesting perspective on the power 
and influence of the High Court over military commanders. He states: 
This judicial review by Israel’s highest Court has not only provided a form of 
redress for the grievances of Area inhabitants and a safeguard for their rights; it 
has also provided a powerful symbol and reminder to the officials of the mili-
tary government and Civil Administration of the supremacy of law and legal 
institutions and of the omnipresence of the Rule of Law . . . . The importance of 
judicial review lies not only in those cases which actually reach the Courts (be-
tween 150 and 300 annually in recent years), but also in the fact that before act-
ing the officials involved know that their acts may be subjected to judicial scru-
tiny. 
AMIT-KOHN ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
 53. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 11. Kretzmer also states: 
The jurisdiction of the Court, as a High Court of Justice, is at present defined in 
section 15 of the Basic Law: Judiciary . . . . Under section 15(c) of this law, the 
Court has the power to deal with matters in which it sees need to grant a rem-
edy for the sake of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another 
court or tribunal . . . . According to section 15(d)(2) the Court has the power to 
grant orders to state authorities, local authorities, their officials and other bod-
ies and persons fulfilling public functions under law, to do an act or to refrain 
from doing an act in lawfully performing their duties. 
Id. 
 54. See Simon, supra note 15, at 20–21. 
 55. The Israeli government has three main branches: the executive, the legislative, 
and the judiciary. See MFA, supra note 19. 
 56. Simon, supra note 15, at 22. 
 57. See HJC 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense 
[1971] 26(1) P.D. 574 [English summary: 2 ISR YHR (1972) 354]. 
 58. Gross, supra note 24, at 208 (“There are no other precedents for a person in occu-
pied territory having recourse to the Supreme Court of the Occupying State against that 
state’s military commander.”). Id. This “unprecedented phenomenon of allowing the 
civilian population access to the occupying power’s national courts and subjecting the 
military government’s conduct to domestic judicial review has added a unique element to 
this occupation.” Id.; Simon, supra note 15, at 23 n.116 (“Unlike the discretionary juris-
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Most relevant to this study is the Court’s handling of cases involving 
the military. Despite Israel’s original plan to establish a constitution, one 
was never implemented.59 However, in 1992, Israel adopted a number of 
Basic Laws of Human Dignity and Liberty, which act as a miniature con-
stitution.60 Using the Basic Laws as its premise, the Israeli High Court 
has the capacity to review the legality of government officials’ actions, 
including military commanders.61 In recent years, actions taken by the 
military and by the Knesset62 have been declared in “violation of the Ba-
sic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty.”63 However, the Court does not 
generally have the ability to review the legislation passed by the Knesset. 
Consequently, “primary legislation is . . . the highest form of law.”64 
In an early attempt to establish unwavering control in the territories, 
the government argued in Hilu v. State of Israel that military orders are 
equivalent to primary legislation and the Court should therefore not have 
judicial review over such actions.65 This argument was rejected by the 
Court, which determined that “military orders are a form of delegated, 
rather than primary, legislation.”66 Ultimately, this led the Court to hold 
                                                                                                             
diction held by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Israeli Supreme Court has mandatory juris-
diction; it adjudicates every case submitted to it.”); see also EYAL BENVENISTI, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 119 (1993) (Hebrew). 
 59. See Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitu-
tional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588 (1996). 
 60. Conversation with Professor Amos Shapira, Faculty of Law Tel-Aviv University 
and visiting Professor at Brooklyn Law School (Apr. 1, 2006). 
 61. See infra Part IV. Judicial review is anchored in the status of the military com-
mander as a public official, and in the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice to issue 
orders to bodies fulfilling public functions by law under § 15(3) of Basic Law: The Judi-
ciary. Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 31. 
 62. The Knesset is Israel’s legislature and is comprised of 120 members. 
Members are elected every four years within the framework of parties that 
compete for the electorate’s votes. Each party chooses its own Knesset candi-
dates as it sees fit. The major function of the Knesset is to legislate laws and 
revise them as necessary. Additional duties include establishing a government, 
taking policy decisions, reviewing government activities, and electing the 
President of the State and the State Comptroller. 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Knesset, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govern 
ment/Branches+of+Government/Legislative/The%20Knesset. 
 63. Quoted from a conversation with Professor Amos Shapira, supra note 60. 
 64. Farrell, supra note 44, at 882. 
 65. See generally HJC 302/72 Hilu v. State of Israel [1972] 27(2) P.D. 169, translated 
in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975). 
 66. Farrell, supra note 44, at 897, citing Hilu, HJC 302/72 169, translated in 5 ISR. 
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975). 
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that as a part of the government administration, military commanders and 
their actions should be reviewed under Israeli administrative law.67 
Under the theory that the rules of administrative law, which apply to all 
Israeli government authorities, also apply to military commanders, the 
Court has actually gone beyond the level of review which is necessary 
under international law.68 In Al-Taliya v. Minister of Defense, Justice 
Shamgar mentioned the duty and power accorded to military command-
ers under international law, but added: “The exercise of powers by the 
respondents will be examined according to the criteria which this court 
applies when it reviews the act or omission of any other arm of the ex-
ecutive branch, while taking into account, of course, the duties of the 
respondents that flow from the nature of their task[s].”69 Justice Shamgar 
further explained that: 
Extending grounds of judicial review beyond the rules of belligerent 
occupation has allowed the Court to argue that in protecting the rights 
of residents in the Territories it has gone much further than required by 
international law. Furthermore, because administrative law may be re-
garded as an internal constraint, whereas international law may be seen 
as an external constraint, the political implications of overturning an act 
of the military on the grounds of Israeli administrative law are less 
threatening than overruling the same act on grounds of international 
law. This may explain why, when alternative grounds exist for overrul-
ing an act, the Court has sometimes seemed to place greater emphasis 
on administrative law.70 
In keeping with its effort to protect individuals living within the Occu-
pied Territories, the Court adopted the principle of proportionality as the 
standard with which it would review military decisions.71 By applying 
                                                                                                             
 67. See HCJ 393/82 Jam’iyat Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [1982] 
P.D. 37(4) 785, 793, cited in Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 24; see also HJC 69/81 Abu 
Aita v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [1981] 37(2) P.D. 197, 230–31, translated 
in 13 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 348 (1983). 
 68. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27. 
 69. KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27, citing HCJ 619/78 Al-Taliya v. Minister of De-
fense [1978] 33(3) PD 505, 512. 
 70. See id. at 27, citing Al-Taliya, HCJ 619/78 505, 512. 
 71. See Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 36–40. In determining which standard to use in 
order to adjudicate the legality of the fence, the Court recognized that: 
Proportionality is not only a general principle of international law. Proportion-
ality is also a general principle of Israeli administrative law. At first a principle 
of our case law, then a constitutional principle, enshrined in article 8 of the Ba-
sic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, it is today one of the basic values of the 
Israeli administrative law. The principle of proportionality applies to every act 
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the proportionality principal, it can be argued that the Court is merely 
placing the proper checks and balances on the government and military’s 
authority in the Occupied Territories.72 
B. The Law of the Land in the Occupied Territories 
In 1967, during the course of the Six Day War,73 Israel captured the 
West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.74 Since then, Israel has ruled 
these territories under a system of belligerent occupation.75 In such a re-
gime, the military is given power over all governmental functions includ-
ing legislating, adjudicating, collecting taxes, policing, and other admin-
                                                                                                             
of the Israeli administrative authorities. It also applies to the use of the military 
commander’s authority pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation. 
Id. ¶ 38 (citations omitted). See also Gross, supra note 24, at 184 (“The requirement of 
proportionality has been applied in the case law of the Supreme Court in a number of 
senses. Thus, for example, the Court has instructed the military commander to conform 
the exercise of his power to the severity of the case and the gravity of the circumstances. 
Consideration must be given not only to the gravity of the acts of which the terrorist is 
suspected, but also to the degree of participation of the rest of the household in advancing 
these acts. Also taken into account is the degree of influence which the demolition of the 
home will have on the other inhabitants thereof.”). 
 72. During a conversation, Professor Shapira stated that as a parliamentary system, 
Israel’s governmental structure does not offer the same modality of the separation of 
powers as the United States’ form of government. Consequently, it is essential that each 
branch of government perform the proper checks and balance of powers on each other. 
 73. The Six Day War was fought between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and 
Syria on the other. “The war was the most dramatic of all wars fought between Israel and 
the Arab nations, resulting in a depression in the Arab world lasting many years. The war 
left Israel with the largest territorial gains from any of the wars the country had been 
involved in: Sinai and Gaza Strip were captured from Egypt, East Jerusalem and West 
Bank from Jordan and Golan Heights from Syria.” Six Day War, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
ORIENT, http://i-cias.com/e.o/sixdaywr.htm. 
 74. See David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 
39, 56 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995). 
 75. Id. Belligerent occupation occurs when a State seizes control of its enemy’s terri-
tory after a period of war. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE 
CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 122 (James B. Scott ed., 1920) (Address of Delegate Martens). 
The law of belligerent occupation 
recognizes that military needs will be the major concern of every army of oc-
cupation. Nevertheless, because the occupying army has control over the occu-
pied territory the occupying power has the duty to take over the first and most 
basic task of every government: maintaining law and order and facilitating eve-
ryday life. 
KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 57. 
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istrative tasks that are provided for by law.76 Despite following the law of 
belligerent occupation, the Israeli government has refrained from recog-
nizing its rule over the Occupied Territories as such.77 This policy allows 
the government greater latitude when implementing policies and enforc-
ing security measures within the Territories.78 
Unlike the government, the Israeli Supreme Court recognizes Israel’s 
rule over the West Bank and Gaza as a belligerent occupation.79 In doing 
so, the Court has decided to enforce the Hague Convention, which is rec-
ognized as the accepted form of international law with regard to belliger-
ent occupation.80 Justice Barak, in a summary of the principles defining 
the power of the military government81 in the Occupied Territories, 
stated: “The military commander may not consider the national, eco-
nomic or social interests of his own country, unless they have implica-
tions for his [country’s] security interest or the interests of the local 
                                                                                                             
 76. See Kretzmer, supra note 74, at 58; see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶67, citing 
Meir Shamgar, Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, in 1 
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 276 (1971) (citing proclamations of the Military Commander). This 
principle was further expressed by the commanders of the IDF upon taking control of the 
Territories in “Section 3 of the Proclamation on Law and Administration [which] stated: 
Any power of government, legislation, appointment, or administration with respect to the 
Region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall be exercised 
only by me or by a person appointed by me to that end or acting on my behalf.” 
KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27. 
 77. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 19, 33. The Israeli government is not opposed to 
the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention. Rather, “it argues that since neither 
Jordan nor Egypt held good title to the West Bank and Gaza, the Occupied Territories 
were not under the sovereignty of a ‘High Contracting Party’ . . . the government argues 
that the legal status of the Occupied Territories precludes application of the law of bellig-
erent occupation.”  Simon, supra note 15, at 20; see also Robert Klein, The Security 
Fence from a Legal Perspective: Question 4—Is Israel an “Occupying Power”?, JEWISH 
AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, http://www.jafi.org.il/education /actual/conflict/fence/2-4.html (“the 
present [4th Geneva] Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” and states that the West Bank 
and Gaza “are not under sovereignty of a High Contracting Party”). 
 78. See KRETZMER, supra note 50. 
 79. See HCJ 606/78, 610/78 Ayyub v. Minister of Defense [1978] 33(2) P.D. 113, 
117, translated in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979); see also Simon, supra note 15, at 
20. 
 80. See Simon, supra note 15, at 20. 
 81. The term “military government” is synonymous with the term “military com-
mander” as the military commander has several government-like functions in the Occu-
pied Territories. In addition, for the purposes of this Note, it reflects the connection be-
tween the military and the government of Israel with regard to the decision making of 
how to proceed with the security of Israel. 
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population.”82 Conversely, the Court does not adhere unconditionally to 
the Geneva Convention.83 According to the predominant understanding 
of international law, in order for the Court to be bound by the Geneva 
Convention, the Convention would have to be adopted into law by the 
Israeli legislature, which has not yet happened.84  Nonetheless, there are 
many instances in which the Court has referred to the Convention to sup-
port or reject the military government’s actions.85 
As a general matter of international law, the two principal influences 
on the law of belligerent occupation are the Fourth Geneva Convention 
of 194986 and the Regulations Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention 
                                                                                                             
 82. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 68. 
 83. Kretzmer argues that in applying international law: 
The Supreme Court has relied on the distinction between customary law and 
conventional law. Following the British tradition, customary international law 
is regarded as part of the common law of the land that will be enforced by the 
domestic courts unless the legislature has provided otherwise. On the other 
hand, conventional law will not be enforced by the domestic courts unless it has 
been incorporated in the domestic legal system through parliamentary legisla-
tion. In this regard, the Court has held that the Hague Regulations Concerning 
the Law and Customs of War on Land, 1907, are part of customary law, which 
the Geneva Convention Concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, 1949 (the Fourth Geneva Convention), is part of conventional law. 
Thus, the Court will enforce the provisions of the Hague Regulations, but not 
those of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Nevertheless, on more than one occa-
sion, the Court has agreed to interpret provisions in the Geneva Convention, but 
only to hold that the authorities had not violated those provisions. 
Kretzmer, supra note 74, at 57; see also Simon, supra note 15, at 20. 
 84. Simon, supra note 15, at 20 (stating that it does not appear as though the Conven-
tion will be adopted into Israeli law anytime in the near future). 
 85. See id. at 20 (citing numerous Israeli cases referring to the convention). 
 86. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Farrell, 
supra note 44, at 915 (“It is often noted that the Israeli Supreme Court has not ruled that 
the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the West Bank and Gaza. It is less often 
mentioned that the Court has never ruled that the Convention is not applicable. The Court 
has essentially avoided the issue.”). With regard to the security fence, several articles of 
the Geneva Convention are relevant. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, art. 23 (pro-
viding the importance of the freedom of movement); art. 28 (referring to the relationship 
between populated areas and the need for military operations); art. 33 (laying out the 
difference and legality of collective punishment versus restrictive measures); art. 46 (re-
garding restrictive measures affecting property rights); art. 53 (determining that the de-
struction of property by an Occupying Power is only justified under military necessity); 
see also Klein, supra note 77. Yet, for the most part, the Court, in its decision regarding 
the fence, focuses on the internationally accepted principle of proportionality in determin-
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of 1907.87 At the core of these sets of laws is the desire to allow the oc-
cupying power the ability to safely and securely oversee its interests, 
while ensuring that it does not encroach upon the human rights of the 
occupied inhabitants.88 This body of law “neither condones nor outlaws 
occupations;”89 rather, it recognizes the reality of such occupations and 
tries to make them as equitable as possible.90 
Besides the law of belligerent occupation, there are three other primary 
legal systems in the Occupied Territories: (1) the local law that was in 
effect in the territories when Israel assumed control during the Six Day 
War;91 (2) all military orders given by military commanders post-
occupation; and (3) the current law in the State of Israel, which is not 
always completely applicable to the Territories, but nonetheless has per-
tinent implications on the review of military decisions.92 
C. Military Orders93 
As discussed in Part II.B, supra, the rules of international law provide 
that the military commander of Israel overseeing the Occupied Territo-
ries has power to legislate in the West Bank.94 This system of military 
control was established by proclamation shortly after Israel took control 
                                                                                                             
ing whether the security fence fits within the balance of national security versus humani-
tarian rights. See Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
 87. Simon, supra note 15, at 19, quoting Regulations Annexed to the Hague Conven-
tion Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 
T.I.A.S. No. 539. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Examples of local laws generally applicable in the Occupied Territories are the 
Defense (Emergency) Regulations which “were part of the local law prevailing there 
immediately prior to Israeli occupation. Following the international law principles that an 
occupying power should not change the law in the occupied territory, Israeli military 
authorities in the territories exercise power under the same regulations as in Israel, but 
these regulations are considered local rather than Israeli law.” Baruch Bracha, Checks 
and Balances in a Protracted State of Emergency—The Case of Israel, in 34 ISR. Y.B. 
HUM. RTS. 124, 45–46 n.25 (2003). 
 92. Kretzmer, supra note 74, at 56. The scope of this Note does not allow for in-depth 
analysis of each of these systems of law. Instead, this Note will reflect upon their impact 
when appropriate within the confines of the Court’s ability to alter government and mili-
tary orders regarding the security of Israeli citizens. 
 93. For a full discussion of this topic, see SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A 
STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY 465 (1994). 
 94. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27 (“Under the rules of international law, when 
an army occupies enemy territory all governmental power, including legislative power, is 
concentrated in the hands of the military commander.”). 
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of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.95 Military commanders have used 
this power freely in order to promulgate military orders ranging from 
administrative issues and security, to education and taxes.96 However, as 
the Court in Beit Sourik articulated, the power of the military commander 
is not that of a sovereign.97 As such, the military is not permitted to pur-
sue every activity it deems preferable, regardless of whether primarily 
motivated by security considerations or other considerations.98 The 
power of the commander is principally restrained only by the process of 
balancing the security interests of Israel against the needs of the Pales-
tinians.99 
Of primary importance to this Note is whether or not military orders 
should be “regarded as parallel to primary legislation and thus immune 
                                                                                                             
 95. Farrell, supra note 44, at 879, citing Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative States of 
Military Occupation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 152 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). Section 3 of the Proclamation of Law and 
Administration states: “Any power of government, legislation, appointment, or admini-
stration with respect to the Region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me 
alone and shall be exercised only by me or by a person appointed by me to that end or 
acting on my behalf.” KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27. 
 96. See KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 10. 
 97. L. Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the In-
habitants, 33 L.Q. REV. 363, 364 (1917), quoted in Yoram Dinstein, The International 
Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 106 
(1978). 
 98. Farrell, supra note 44, at 880. 
 99. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 34, citing Yoram Dinstein, Legislative Authority in 
the Administered Territories, 2 LYUNEI MISHPAT 505, 509 (1972) (Hebrew) (“The law of 
war usually creates a delicate balance between two poles: military necessity on one hand, 
and humanitarian considerations on the other.”). The Supreme Court has discussed this 
balance in many cases. Providing a brief explanation of the power of the military com-
mander within the confines of the Hague Convention, Justice Barak states: 
The Hague Convention authorizes the military commander to act in two central 
areas: one—ensuring the legitimate security interest of the holder of the terri-
tory, and the other—providing for the needs of the local population in the terri-
tory held in belligerent occupation. . . . The first need is military and the second 
is civilian-humanitarian. The first focuses upon the security of the military 
forces holding the area, and the second focuses upon the responsibility for en-
suring the well being of the residents. In the latter area the military commander 
is responsible not only for the maintenance of the order and security of the in-
habitants, but also for the protection of their rights, especially their constitu-
tional human rights. The concern for human rights stands at the center of the 
humanitarian considerations which the military commander must take into ac-
count. 
Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 34, citing HJC 10356/02 Hess v. Commander of the IDF 
Forces in the West Bank [2002] P.D. 58(3) 443, 456 ¶ 8. 
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from review, or as parallel to subordinate or delegated legislation, [and] 
hence subject to review under the rules of administrative law.”100 In mat-
ters of national security, it is almost a universal phenomenon that courts 
remain extremely careful about engaging in such matters.101 As former 
Justice of the Supreme Court Itzhak Zamir cautioned, issues of national 
security are often clouded in secrecy, or are of vital importance to poli-
cies concerning national interests, and it is therefore not always appro-
priate for the Court to intervene.102 He further wrote that the Court 
should “leave the responsibility in such matters to the competent authori-
ties, political or professional, civil or military. Such an attitude may be 
especially understandable, and possibly justifiable in Israel, given the 
State’s constant exposure to security risks.”103 Yet, over the years, the 
Court has both expanded its jurisdiction over administrative actions, as 
well as expanded the realm of administrative legislation to include mili-
tary orders.104 As a result, military orders are reviewed under both inter-
national law and Israeli administrative law.105 The latter standard is ap-
                                                                                                             
 100. KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 27–28. 
 101. Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Law in Israel, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 37 (Itzhak 
Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Gelpe, supra note 37, at 528; see, e.g., HCJ 69/81 Abu Itta v. IDF Commander in 
Judea and Samaria [1981] P.D. 37(2) 197 [English summary: 13 ISR YHR (1983) 348]. 
Judicial review of administrative decisions in Israel developed as follows: 
Judicial review of administrative actions was introduced in [the land that would 
eventually become the State of] Israel during the period of the British Mandate. 
It was copied from the law in England at the time, with one important differ-
ence. In England, petitions to review administrative decisions could be brought 
in a lower court, sitting under the title of the High Court of Justice. In the Brit-
ish Mandate, which ruled the area now comprising the State of Israel from 
World War I until 1948, this authority was placed in the hands of the Supreme 
Court alone. Lower courts had judges drawn from the local Arab and Jewish 
population. The British authorities did not entrust review of their actions to 
these local judges, but rather located review in the Israeli Supreme Court, 
where a majority of the justices were English. The system was maintained after 
the establishment of the State, perhaps because only the Supreme Court was 
viewed as strong enough to control the governmental authorities and to protect 
civil rights from encroachment. 
Gelpe, supra note 37, at 523. 
 105. See Kretzmer, supra note 74, at 56. See also HCJ 393/82 Jam’iyat Ascan v. IDF 
Commander in Judea and Samaria [1982] P.D. 37(4) 785, 793, quoted in Beit Sourik, 
HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 24 (“Together with the provisions of international law, ‘the principles of 
the Israeli administrative law regarding the use of governing authority’ apply to the mili-
tary commander.”). 
878 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:3 
plied to all branches of Israel’s government, regardless of whether the 
actions being reviewed took place in the Territories or in the sovereign 
State of Israel.106 
III. PROPORTIONALITY 
The principle of proportionality107 is recognized as both a general stan-
dard of international law and a fundamental principle of Israeli adminis-
trative law.108 At the core of the principle is the belief that the means ap-
plied to achieve a given end should not be unduly excessive.109 In the 
framework of military action or armed conflict, the principle seeks to 
balance the need to achieve a particular military objective against the 
rights and needs of those affected by that particular action.110 In its earli-
est form, and as applied presently in most English jurisdictions, the pro-
portionality test was a standard with which to judge reasonableness.111 In 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. 
 107. The term proportionality as a general notion derives from the word “proportion,” 
which signifies “the due relation of one part to another” or “such relation of size etc., 
between things or parts of things as renders the whole harmonious.” See Proportionality, 
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1140 (1992), quoting THE SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. 
 108. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38–39; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 107, at 
1140–41. 
 109. See Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 465, 467 (2005) (stating that “one should not use a sledge hammer 
to crack a nut”); see also Gross, supra note 24, at 185 (commenting on the test of propor-
tionality with regard to home demolitions, Gross states: “According to the test of propor-
tionality, which is one of the cornerstones in the examination of the reasonableness of the 
decision of the military commander according to administrative law, where it is possible 
to achieve a deterrent effect by something less than demolishing the entire house this 
must be done. Likewise, where it is possible to achieve the deterrence by sealing the 
house this must suffice.”). 
 110. Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by 
Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 363 (2001) 
(focusing exclusively on the principle of proportionality as it affects armed conflicts. In 
effect, the Article argues that “as methods of warfare reached higher levels of sophistica-
tion, concerns about the safety and protection of citizens emerged, and proportionality 
became a focal point of the laws of armed conflict. The notion that a belligerent’s right to 
use force is limited had the effect of continuing the prohibition on the use of specific 
means of warfare. It further restricted the use of non-prohibited means of warfare to the 
extent that the means were deemed proportional to the achievement of a military objec-
tive.”). 
 111. Itzhak Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality, in 
PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 332 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996). Relying on Israeli 
case law, Zamir defined “unreasonableness” as “an established ground of review which 
has been developed and defined through the case law. An administrative decision is un-
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some jurisdictions, including Israel, the test is now recognized as its own 
distinct ground of judicial review.112 
The principle of proportionality consists of three subtests which the 
Court applies to determine if the governmental objective and the means 
used to achieve that objective are proportional to each other.113 The first 
subtest calls for “the objective to be related to the means,” or put another 
way, that there is a rational connection between the two.114 The second 
subtest requires that the administrative body employ the least harmful 
means in order to achieve its objective.115 The third subtest demands that 
the “damage caused to the individual by the means used by the adminis-
trative body in order to achieve its objectives must be of proper propor-
tion to the gain brought about by that means.”116 
As its own basis for review, the proportionality test expands the 
Court’s scope of review by providing it with the ability to review the 
administrative process as well as the end result.117 Consequently, the 
High Court is afforded an effective channel through which to control 
administrative discretion.118 By applying this standard to military deci-
sions such as the security fence, the Israeli High Court has, in recent 
years, become much more willing to intervene and apply its own position 
on matters of security.119 
Further expanding the influence of the Court in Israeli administrative 
law is the High Court’s apparent merging of the domestic and interna-
tional rationales of the principle of proportionality.120 Rather than recog-
nize the distinct differences between the international and domestic 
spheres with regard to the development and application of proportional-
                                                                                                             
reasonable, according to case law, if it is capricious or arbitrary, manifestly unjust, made 
in bad faith, or oppressive.” Id. at 327. 
 112. Id. at 332. 
 113. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 40. 
 114. Id. at ¶ 41. 
 115. Id. (stating that this is referred to as the “least injurious means” test). 
 116. Id. (“The test of proportionality ‘in the narrow sense’ is commonly applied with 
‘absolute values,’ by directly comparing the advantage of the administrative act with the 
damage that results from it. However, it is also possible to apply the test of proportional-
ity in the narrow sense in a ‘relative manner.’ According to this approach, the administra-
tive act is tested vis-à-vis an alternate act, whose benefit will be somewhat smaller than 
that of the former one. The original administrative act is disproportionate in the narrow 
sense if a certain reduction in the advantage gained by the original act—by employing 
alternate means, for example—ensures a substantial reduction in the injury caused by the 
administrative act.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Zamir, supra note 101, at 37. 
 120. See infra notes 121, 124. 
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ity, the Court appears to take the method of review from domestic law 
and the scope of its applicability from international law.121 As a principle 
of domestic law, “proportionality has the function of relating means and 
ends properly or of balancing conflicting but equally high ranking fun-
damental rights and freedoms. It primarily fulfils a guiding function for 
the law-applying authorities rather than in itself being a substantive, con-
crete legal norm.”122 Under international law, the range of issues for 
which the principle of proportionality can be applied is greater than in 
domestic law and includes issues such as reprisal and self-defense,123 
humanitarian law,124 economic sanctions,125 and human rights admini-
stration.126 
                                                                                                             
 121. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 107, at 1140 (stating that from an international stand-
point, the principle of proportionality was first recognized as a customary international 
law dealing with reprisal and self-defense. Recently, the applicability of this principle has 
expanded beyond instances of self-defense and spread into areas involving humanitarian 
law, economic sanctions, and human rights administration). The principle is often com-
pared to “other open constitutional principles, the concrete legal meaning of which must 
be ascertained in their application to individual cases.” Id. at 1141. This principle has 
found great acceptance in domestic law and is often mentioned synonymously with the 
principles of reasonableness and necessity. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1140–41. 
 123. While the scope of the right is smaller under domestic law, both domestic and 
international law allow States to defend themselves against violations of their rights per-
petrated by other States or actors. Id. 
 124. The principle of proportionality has long been firmly established in humanitarian 
law as it is inherent in principles of necessity and humanity which form the basis of hu-
manitarian law. The prohibition of unnecessary suffering (Article 23(c) of Hague Con-
vention IV of 1907) was the first codification of the principle of proportionality which 
had, however, already been accepted in international customary law. Today it has found 
broad recognition in the new rules for victims of armed conflicts in Protocol I Additional 
to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949. Id. at 1142. 
 125. Another area where the principle of proportionality is relevant for the determina-
tion of the legality or illegality of State actions is that of economic sanctions.  If such 
measures are taken by way of reprisal, the applicability of the principle of proportionality 
is mandatory since only proportionate acts of reprisal are permissible. Id. at 1143. 
 126. See generally id. at 1140–44 (stating that the principle of proportionality has also 
been firmly established in the universal and regional administration of the law of human 
rights. As human rights and fundamental freedoms do not guarantee limitless freedom to 
the individual but are necessary subject to certain restrictions in the public interest, it is 
an accepted principle in domestic as well as international law that the scopes of the indi-
vidual’s enjoyment of human rights and the limits to it have to be brought into due rela-
tions); see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 39 (“Both international law and the funda-
mental principles of Israeli administrative law recognize proportionality as a standard for 
balancing the authority of the military commander in the area with the needs of the local 
population.”). 
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IV. THE SECURITY FENCE 
In order to comprehend the immensity of the decision to build the 
fence, as well as the fears of many Palestinians, it is necessary to under-
stand where the fence will be located and what the fence actually entails. 
This first part of this section presents the basic geographical placement 
of the fence, while the second part briefly explains the composition of 
the fence. 
A. Security Fence Policy 
In July 2001, the Defense Cabinet, on the recommendation of the 
Fence Bureau, approved the Security Fence program. At the time, the 
Cabinet believed that the fence would consist of three separate obstacle 
sections totaling 80 kilometers (50 miles), one each in Um el Fahem, 
Tulkarem, and Jerusalem, for the purpose of preventing illegal entry into 
Israel.127 However, over time, it became evident that in order to be effec-
tive, the obstacle would have to be continuous and more advanced.128 
These concerns were addressed when the responsibility of constructing 
the fence was placed in the hands of the Ministry of Defense in April 
2002.129 The Ministry of Defense determined that the construction of the 
security fence would take place in four phases and the final obstruction 
would be approximately 728 kilometers (452 miles) in length.130 
The first phase (Phase A), which was approved in August 2002, con-
sisted of 137 kilometers (85 miles) of fence from Salim to Elqana and 20 
kilometers (12.5 miles) in northern and southern parts of Jerusalem.131 
                                                                                                             
 127. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/ 
pages/eng/purpose.htm. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Consulate General of Israel in San Francisco Department of Media and Public 
Affairs, The Security Fence: Facts and Figures, http://www.israelemb.org/la/news/ 
Fence/Fence%20Presentation%20New%20York.ppt [hereinafter Facts and Figures]. The 
actual length and route of the fence is continually changing. Jewish Virtual Library, Is-
rael’s Security Fence, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html (“As 
a result of the modifications, the length of the barrier is expected to be approximately 416 
miles.”). 
 131. Id. In Mara’abe, the Court states: 
The separation fence discussed in the petition before us is part of phase A of 
fence construction. The separation fence discussed in The Beit Sourik Case is 
part of phase C of fence construction. The length of the entire fence, including 
all four phases, is approximately 763 km. According to information relayed to 
us, approximately 242 km of fence have already been erected, and are in opera-
tional use. 28 km of it are built as a wall (11%). Approximately 157 km are cur-
rently being built, 140 km of which are fence and approximately 17 km are 
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Due to topographical and security needs,132 8 kilometers (5 miles) of the 
fence were formed by concrete walls.133 This phase of the fence was 
completed in July 2003.134 Phase B, which extends sixty kilometers 
(forty miles) from Salim to Tirat-Zvi and to Mt. Avner has also been 
completed.135 The next phase of the fence is divided into three segments, 
C1, C2, and C3. All three parts were approved in 2003 and will incorpo-
rate Jerusalem.136 The first section, C1, will consist of three segments 
comprising approximately 64 kilometers (40 miles) in the areas between 
Beit Sahur and the Olive Junction, Qalandyia and Anatot, as well as 
specified sections around Bir Nabala.137 As with Phase A, certain sec-
tions of this fence will require concrete walls as a result of sniper fire in 
certain places.138 Phases C2 and C3 include “the fence between Elkana 
and the Camp Ofer military base, a fence east of the Ben Gurion airport 
and north of planned highway 45, and a fence protecting Israeli commu-
nities in Samaria (including Ariel, Emanuel, Kedumim, Karnei Shom-
ron).”139 This section is currently under construction and when completed 
will be nearly 150 kilometers long.140 In certain areas, depending on se-
curity needs, an actual wall, as opposed to a fence, will be built.141 Fi-
nally, as approved by the Ministry of Defense in October 2003, Phase D 
will consist of a 52 kilometer (32 mile) fence in Tunnels Batir, a 30 
kilometer (19 mile) section in Batir Surif, and a 93 kilometer (58 mile) 
addition in Surif Carmel.142 
                                                                                                             
wall (12%). The building of 364 km of the separation fence has not yet been 
commenced, of which 361 km are fence, and 3 km are wall. 
Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 3. 
 132. Facts and Figures, supra note 130. 
 133. Id.; see also Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127. 
 134. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127. 
 135. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 5. This section of the fence was approved in Decem-
ber 2002. Id. 
 136. Jewish Virtual Library, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 130. 
 137. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 6; see also Facts and Figures, supra note 130. 
 138. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127; see also Jewish 
Virtual Library, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 130. 
 139. Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 3. 
 140. See Facts and Figures, supra note 130. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. The approximated lengths of the fence and areas provided are subject to 
change. 
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B. Composition of the Fence 
The security fence “is a multi layered composite obstacle comprised of 
several elements.”143 At its core stands a technologically advanced 
fence.144 While this chain-link fence appears in many places similar to 
any other fence, it is equipped with underground and long-range sensors 
to help alert authorities of attempts to infiltrate the border.145 On the ex-
ternal side of the fence is an anti-vehicle obstacle, generally in the form 
of a trench, which is intended to prevent vehicles from being able to 
smash into the fence.146 Just beyond these obstacles, there is also an addi-
tional fence and barbed wire in order to slow the progress of intruders.147 
Closest to the fence on its internal side is a dirt road meant to preserve 
foot prints or other markings that will indicate a breach in security.148 On 
both sides of the electric fence are patrol roads, which are used by the 
IDF and border patrol in their efforts to guard the area.149 In addition to 
another fence on the interior side of the fence, landmines and unmanned 
armored vehicles are strategically placed along the barrier in order to 
deter individuals from trying to cross the fence in an unmarked area.150 
In most areas, the fence and its additional components are approxi-
mately 60 meters (180 feet) wide.151 This figure varies depending on cer-
tain restraints or necessities depending on the topography and environ-
mental needs of certain areas.152 Likewise, some areas require higher 
fences and even concrete structures in order to prevent infiltration.153 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 143. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127. 
 144. Jewish Virtual Library, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 130. 
 145. Id.; see also Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127. 
 146. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 7. 
 147. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127; see also Beit 
Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
 148. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Jewish Virtual Library, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 130. 
 151. Id.; see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
 152. Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Security Fence, supra note 127. See also Beit 
Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
 153. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 38. 
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V. DISPROPORTIONAL DEFERENCE 
In Parts II, III, and IV supra, this Note addressed the Israeli legal sys-
tem as relevant to the Occupied Territories, the principle of proportional-
ity as used by the Court, and the position and construction of the security 
fence respectively. This part examines the deference with which the 
Court gives to the Israeli government and military regarding decisions of 
national security. This Note contends that the proportionality test as 
originally conceived and previously applied is an improper inroad 
through which the High Court of Justice enabled itself to review the Is-
raeli government’s and military’s decision to erect the security fence. 
Additionally, this part focuses on the failure of the Court to recognize the 
unprecedented nature of the security fence and the overwhelming impact 
the fence has with regard to counterterrorism and the future of the re-
gion.154 Finally, this section will argue that the proportionality test, while 
evolving in scope, was not intended to shatter the delicate balance be-
tween the need for judicial review of administrative actions and the nec-
essary discretion afforded to military commanders when given the re-
sponsibility of protecting Israeli lives and developing counterterrorism 
measures.155 
A. The Court’s Review of Military Orders 
Since establishing the ability to review military orders, supra Part II.C, 
the Court has attempted to define the scope of its power.156 Some schol-
ars argue that the Court fails to fully address military actions by inconsis-
tently applying the standards of review that it has set forth.157 These 
scholars believe that the Court allows the military too much deference in 
shaping policy in the Territories, particularly with regard to determining 
the necessity of security actions.158 Others, however, are adamant in their 
                                                                                                             
 154. The Court itself denied the political implications of the fence. Beit Sourik, HCJ 
2056/04 ¶ 33. However, it is clear that the fence could lead to future talks between the 
Israeli government and Palestinian Authority, either as a result of lowered tension from 
diminished terrorist activity, or through the pressure undoubtedly caused by the social 
and economic implications of the fence. The scope of this Note does not go beyond the 
use of the proportionality test. While scholarly works have yet to appear in large numbers 
with regard to the fence, other issues involving the fence will only be addressed as neces-
sary and only in connection to the test of proportionality. 
 155. C.f. Gross, supra note 24. 
 156. Zamir, supra note 101, at 37. 
 157. KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 29. 
 158. See Kretzmer, supra note 50, at 74; but see Gross, supra note 24, at 181. 
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belief that the Court lacks self-restraint.159 Despite the disagreement be-
tween scholars, it is clear that the Court no longer defers to the Knesset 
or the military, but rather reviews security decisions as though they were 
any other administrative legislation.160 As a result, security assessments 
have become a joint effort between the government, military, and judici-
ary.161 Such a situation is counterintuitive in a democratic system162 as it 
erodes the separation of powers.163 
                                                                                                             
 159. Gelpe, supra note 37, at 493. Even others believe that the Court has found a 
proper balance between its own discretion and that of the military’s. Detlev F. Vagts, 
International Decision: Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank. Case No. HCJ 7015/02 
[2002] Isr. L. Rep. 1. Supreme Court of Israel, September 3, 2002, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
173, 175 (2003) (“One admires the meticulous and courageous way in which the Israeli 
Supreme Court, acting as it did in the immediate vicinity of violence, approached the task 
of distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate uses of the executive’s security 
powers.”). 
 160. See generally Bracha, supra note 91, at 39; see also Gelpe, supra note 37, at 493. 
 161. See generally Gross, supra note 24. 
 162. In the landmark decision for judicial review, United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Co-
operative Village, Justice Barak validated judicial review as “an affirmation of democ-
racy itself. [T]he judicial review of constitutionality is the very essence of democracy, for 
democracy does not only connote the rule of the majority. Democracy also means the rule 
of basic values and human rights as expressed in the constitution.”  Ralph Ruebner, De-
mocracy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the Age of Terrorism: The Experience 
of Israel—A Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 499–500 (2003), 
quoting CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] P.D. 
49(iv) 221, translated in Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in 
Israel, 33 ISR. L. REV. 259 (1999). 
 163. Cf. Gelpe, supra note 37, at 93; see also KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 191 (“In 
democratic countries, courts enjoy varying degrees of independence. This independence 
ensures that the judges’ decisions are based on their conscience and are not dictated by 
other branches of government” and vice versa). But see J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF 
THE JUDICIARY 272 (4th ed. 1991) (“Courts are part of the machinery of the authority 
within the State and as such cannot avoid the making of political decisions.”).  It is fur-
ther argued that the evolution of the judiciary requires that it becomes involved in the 
political aspects of the other branches of government: 
In the traditional view, the function of the judiciary is to decide disputes in ac-
cordance with the law and with impartiality. The law is thought of as an estab-
lished body of principles which prescribe rights and duties. Impartiality means 
not merely an absence of personal bias or prejudice in the judge but also the 
exclusion of ‘irrelevant’ considerations such as his political or religious views. 
A more sophisticated version of this traditional view sees the judiciary as one 
of the principle organs of a democratic society without whom government 
could be carried on only with great difficulty. The essence of their function is 
the maintenance of law and order and the judges are seen as a mediating influ-
ence.  
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The Court’s increasingly aggressive position when reviewing military 
actions is apparent, despite language by the Court which purports a more 
balanced approach.164 Justice Barak has stated on several occasions: 
The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, reviews the 
legality of the military commander’s discretion . . . . In exercising judi-
cial review, we do not turn ourselves into experts in security affairs. 
We do not substitute the security considerations of the military com-
mander with our own security considerations. We take no position re-
garding the way security affairs are run. Our task is to guard the bor-
ders and to maintain the boundaries of the military commander’s dis-
cretion . . . . Thus, we shall not be deterred from reviewing the deci-
sions of the military commander . . . simply because of the important 
security considerations anchoring his decision. However, we shall not 
substitute the discretion of the commander with our own discretion. We 
shall check the legality of the discretion of the military commander and 
ensure that his decisions fall within the zone of reasonableness.165 
In the past, such a statement could be construed to indicate that the Court 
was prepared to show the military great deference in reviewing military 
orders.166 In fact, past case law demonstrates that when reviewing mili-
tary officials’ decisions in the Territories, the Court, more often than not, 
sided with the military government.167 For some, the Court’s propensity 
to side with the military government legitimizes Israel’s Occupation and 
provides the government with a degree of autonomy over matters involv-
ing the West Bank and Gaza.168 This belief seems to have lost promi-
nence recently given that Justice Barak has also ruled: 
The judgments of the Supreme Court stated more than once that the se-
curity considerations of the army, both inside Israel as well as in Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza, are subject to judicial review, and that this judicial 
review is not limited to questions of jurisdiction or the presence of se-
curity considerations . . . it extends to the whole gamut of grounds for 
review, including questions of reasonableness of the security considera-
tions.169 
                                                                                                             
J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 187–88 (2d ed. 1979). 
 164. For a comprehensive survey of the Court’s increasing intervention in the actions 
of the security authorities, see Bracha, supra note 91, at 39. 
 165. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 46. 
 166. Simon, supra note 15, at 24. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense [1988] P.D. 42(2) 441, 486; see 
Simon, supra note 15, at 23 n.117. 
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One of the most common illustrations170 of the Court’s movement to-
ward active management of military activity in the Occupied Territories 
is the review of military orders involving home demolitions.171 The 
stated military objectives for ordering home demolitions are to punish 
those who commit acts of terror against Israel and to deter those who are 
thinking about committing such acts.172 Similar to the reaction of many 
                                                                                                             
 170. There are many examples of military orders which the High Court has ruled on, 
however few are as widely discussed, both positively and negatively as home demoli-
tions. While it would be impossible to go into each type of military action which has 
come under review by the Court, by using home demolitions, it is possible to grasp the 
difference between what this Note would consider a proper military action to be reviewed 
by the Court using the proportionality test, and the security fence, which this Note argues 
should be outside the Court’s review. With this in mind, it is also important to note that in 
both instances, home demolitions and the building of the security fence, the Court should 
show extreme deference to the government and military commanders who take responsi-
bility for the results of their actions. 
 171. Simon, supra note 15, at 7 (“The practice of home demolitions has been employed 
since . . . 1967.”). Home demolitions are either carried out by blowing up the home with 
explosives or destroying the structure using a bulldozer. The authority to order home 
demolitions stems from Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 
1442), Reg. 119, para. 2, at 1089 (Supp. II Sept. 27, 1945) [hereinafter Defense Emer-
gency Regulations]. The regulation provides: 
A military commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of 
Palestine of any house, structure or land form in which he has reason to suspect 
that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explo-
sive or incendiary article illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise 
discharged or of any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, 
quarter or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satis-
fied have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or 
been accessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence against these 
Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court offence, 
and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military 
commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the 
house, the structure or the land. 
Id.; see also Gross, supra note 24, at 181 (arguing that the “Regulation cannot be said to 
be inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State 
since a democratic state must also equip its military commanders with efficient tools for 
fighting terrorism.” The article articulates that it cannot be said that “fighting terrorism is 
an improper purpose.”). Id.; see HJC 2722/92 Alamarin v. Commander [1992] P.D. 46(3) 
693, 702 (Hebrew) (per Justice Cheshin), cited in Gross, supra note 24, at n.75. 
 172. Gross, supra note 24, at 181–82 (“It seems that the legislature intended to enable 
the military commander to respond in an effective and suitable manner to every act that 
impairs the security of the population or threatens public order. The military commander 
has broad power to order the confiscation of land and thereafter the demolition of the 
structure or structures of which the terrorist made use in the commission of the offense. 
Moreover, the military commander may make these orders even if the act of terror was 
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scholars with regard to the building of the security fence,173 there are 
those who feel that home demolitions go far beyond their stated purpose 
and in fact result in collateral damage to innocent people, often times to 
terrorists’ wives, children, parents, and siblings.174 In order to remedy the 
conflict between the necessity of home demolitions and the fear of con-
doning collective punishment, the Court has sought to quell the two con-
cerns by allowing those who feel bereaved by any military order to peti-
tion the High Court to contest the order’s legality.175 
The impact of the Court’s willingness to provide direct access to the 
High Court of Justice has been two-fold with regard to the military 
commanders’ authority.176 On the one hand, it has provided the Court 
with an effective method of supervising the military commanders’ au-
thority in an area which in the past was not always open to judicial inter-
vention.177 On the other hand, it has slowed down the response time of 
the military to certain threats and made the work of the military com-
manders more difficult.178 Returning to the example of home demoli-
tions, the Court’s decision to allow for review has left the military unable 
to immediately destroy a terrorist’s residence, as soldiers are now obli-
gated to wait for the inhabitants of the home to exercise their rights be-
fore the Court.179 
However, because each home demolition is technically unrelated to the 
next, it seems reasonable for the Court to have review over this military 
action, especially since the success of one demolition is not dependent on 
the next. Herein lies the significant difference between home demolitions 
and the security fence: a ruling by the Court that a demolition is too ex-
treme does not negatively affect the overall purpose of home demoli-
                                                                                                             
not committed from the relevant land. It is sufficient that the land served as the home of 
the terrorist.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 24. 
 174. Id. at 182. For these scholars, home demolitions are more analogous to other 
forms of collective punishment, a prohibited form of justice under Israeli law. Id. (“The 
power given to the military commander under Regulation 119 is not the power of the 
collective punishment. Its exercise is not intended to punish the family members of the 
Petitioner. The power is administrative and its exercise is intended to deter and thereby 
preserve public order.”); see also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 86, art. 33(1) 
(“No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally com-
mitted. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism [are] 
prohibited.”). 
 175. Gross, supra note 24, at 187. 
 176. Id. at 230. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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tions, whereas allowing the Court to determine the proper route of a sec-
tion of the fence can directly affect not only the quality of that particular 
region, but the effectiveness of the fence as a whole. 
The construction of the security fence is unique from other instances in 
which the Court has applied the proportionality test because the fence 
represents a shift in Israel’s policy towards terrorism. Instead of reacting 
to specific terrorist activity, the government is attempting to preemp-
tively stop all terrorists from entering Israel from the Territories.180 As a 
result, unlike situations dealt with in previous case law such as curfew 
orders, home demolitions, and the treatment of imprisoned terrorists, the 
security fence cannot be linked to several random acts of terrorism, but 
must be viewed in its entirety, as a policy decision designed to end all 
terrorism. Whereas the proportionality test can be properly applied to a 
home demolition to determine whether destroying a terrorist’s home is 
proportional to the damage that he caused through his terrorist act, the 
Court does not have the means or the expertise to evaluate the govern-
ment’s overarching policy towards fighting terrorism as a whole.181 
B. The Court Did Not Give the Military the Proper Deference Under Its 
Proportionality Test 
When the Court applied the proportionality test to examine the mili-
tary’s decision to build the fence, the Court failed to properly weigh the 
authority of the military commander, and to show deference to his exper-
tise. As the Court in Beit Sourik openly admitted, the Justices of the High 
Court “are not experts in military affairs.”182 Consequently, at the outset 
of its analysis, the Court explained that when applying its proportionality 
test, it would not attempt to substitute its opinion for that of the military 
commander’s, nor would it require that the opinion of the Court and the 
opinion of the commander correspond.183 Instead, the Court stated that all 
it could do was “determine whether a reasonable military commander 
would have set out the route as this military commander did.”184 As a 
                                                                                                             
 180. See generally id. 
 181. Cf. R. COTTERREL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 235 (2d ed. 1992); see also 
KRETZMER, supra note 50, at 192 (“In some jurisdictions courts have avoided ruling in 
such situations, relying on doctrines of nonjusticiability or ‘act of state’ to justify their 
passivity.”). 
 182. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 46. 
 183. The Court in Beit Sourik stated: “We shall not examine whether the military 
commander’s military opinion corresponds to ours—to the extent that we have an opinion 
regarding the military character of the route. So we act in all questions which are matters 
of professional expertise, and so we act in military affairs as well.” Id. 
 184. Id. 
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result, the Court gave the impression that its final ruling as to the propor-
tionality of the fence would be based heavily on the conclusions of the 
military commander. However, this was not the case, and while the Court 
purported to show deference to the military, in reality, it failed to do 
so.185 
The Court directly addressed the weight that should be given to the 
military commander when it determined that the opinion of the Council 
for Peace and Security186 could not be adopted by the Court.187 In fact, 
the Court stated that “at the foundation of this approach is our long-held 
view that we must grant special weight to the military opinion of the of-
ficial who is responsible for security.”188 
                                                                                                             
 185. Id. ¶¶ 45, 60, 62. 
 186. Members of the council moved to be joined as amici curiae and were granted 
recognition. The council of former military personnel submitted several affidavits claim-
ing that the route of the security fence was unnecessary. 
In an additional affidavit (from April 18, 2004), members of The Council for 
Peace and Security stated that the desire of the commander of the area to pre-
vent direct flat-trajectory fire upon the separation fence causes damage from a 
security perspective. Due to this desire, the fence passes through areas that, 
though they have topographical control, are superfluous, unnecessarily injuring 
the local population and increasing friction with it, all without preventing fire 
upon the fence. 
Petitioners, pointing to the affidavits of the Council for Peace and Security, ar-
gue that the route of the separation fence is disproportionate. It does not serve 
the security objectives of Israel, since establishing the route adjacent to the 
houses of the Palestinians will endanger the state and her soldiers who are pa-
trolling along the fence, as well as increasing the general danger to Israel’s se-
curity. In addition, such a route is not the least injurious means, since it is pos-
sible to move the route farther away from petitioners’ villages and closer to Is-
rael. It will be possible to overcome the concern about infiltration by reinforc-
ing the fence and its accompanying obstacles. 
Id. ¶ 18–19. 
 187. Id. ¶ 47 (“In this state of affairs, are we at liberty to adopt the opinion of the 
Council for Peace and Security? Our answer is negative.”). 
 188. Id. The Court continues to emphasize the importance of deferring to the opinion 
of the military commander. Vice-President M. Landau J. dealt with this point in a case 
where the Court stood before two expert opinions, that of the Major General serving as 
Coordinator of IDF Activity in the Territories and that of a reserve Major General. Thus 
wrote the Court: 
In such a dispute regarding military-professional questions, in which the Court 
has no well founded knowledge of its own, the witness of respondents, who 
speaks for those actually responsible for the preservation of security in the ad-
ministered territories and within the Green Line, shall benefit from the assump-
tion that his professional reasons are sincere reasons. Very convincing evidence 
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The military’s expertise is most pertinent in the third subtest of the 
proportionality principle since it examines whether the benefit derived 
from the fence is in proportion to the injury caused to the Palestinians as 
a result of its construction.189 In order to determine if the route chosen by 
the military fulfilled the objective of gaining the greatest security advan-
tage with the least harm to the inhabitants, the Court determined that it 
must weigh the opinions of the military against the claims of the inhabi-
tants. The Court came to the conclusion that in many areas, the fence did 
not meet this standard, despite arguments by the military that the route 
was necessary to ensure the security of Israeli citizens. 
In complete contrast to the Court’s earlier dictum, it effectively ignored 
the military commander’s reasoning behind the placement of the fence 
and instead turned to the Council for Peace and Security in several in-
stances to find an alternative route.190 The Court had previously stated 
that it could not adopt the opinion of the Council for Peace and Secu-
rity;191 yet, when determining the route of the fence pursuant to Order no. 
Tav/107/03 and Order no. Tav/108/03,192 the Court held that the proposal 
provided by the Council could be considered.193 Thus, while the Court 
stated one standard at the beginning of its opinion, during its examination 
it failed to abide by its rhetoric. 
                                                                                                             
is necessary in order to negate this assumption. Justice Vitkon wrote similarly 
in Duikat, in which the Court stood before a contrast between the expert opin-
ion of the serving Chief of the General Staff regarding the security of the area, 
and the expert opinion of a former Chief of the General Staff. The Court ruled, 
in that case, as follows: In security issues, where the petitioner relies on the 
opinion of an expert in security affairs, and the respondent relies on the opinion 
of a person who is both an expert and also responsible for the security of the 
state, it is natural that we will grant special weight to the opinion of the latter. 
Therefore, in our examination of the contrasting military considerations in this 
case, we give special weight to the fact that the commander of the area is re-
sponsible for security. Having employed this approach, we are of the opinion—
the details of which we shall explain below—that petitioners have not carried 
their burden, and have not convinced us that we should prefer the professional 
expert opinion of members of the Council for Peace and Security over the secu-
rity stance of the commander of the area. We are dealing with two military ap-
proaches. Each of them has military advantages and disadvantages. In this state 
of affairs, we must place the expert opinion of the military commander at the 
foundation of our decision. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 189. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 59. 
 190. Id. ¶ 71. 
 191. Id. ¶ 47. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 71. 
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While the Court has attempted to develop the proportionality test and 
expand its application, neither past case law nor the scholarly works cited 
by the Court directly deal with a situation such as the security fence. In 
fact, of the material the Court cites to in the Beit Sourik opinion, the arti-
cle most directly linked to the security fence states that the principle of 
proportionality “is often difficult to apply . . . especially in counterterror-
ist194 operations.”195 Thus, while the Court was correct in stating that 
“proportionality plays a central role in the law regarding armed conflict” 
and that “during such conflicts, there is frequently a need to balance mili-
tary needs with humanitarian considerations,”196 once the Court deemed 
security to be the motivation behind the fence, it should have provided 
the military commander greater deference in his determination as to the 
necessary route of the security fence.197 
Proponents of judicial intervention argue that it is necessary for the 
Court to have the ability to oversee all government and military decisions 
concerning national security because such decisions are most likely to 
run the risk of suppressing liberties.198 The reality of the security fence is 
that it will cause hardships to the Palestinians—specifically with regard 
to the loss of land. As a result, it was proper for the Court to rule on the 
legality of the fence in general, to determine whether the military com-
mander had the proper authority to order its construction. However, 
when the Court divided the security fence into various segments in order 
to apply the proportionality test, it disregarded the underlying rationale 
and justification for the fence as a whole.199 The objective of the fence is 
to protect Israelis and to save lives.200 The Court could not justify trading 
                                                                                                             
 194. Counter-terrorism has been defined as “offensive military operations designed to 
prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.” Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on 
Terror, in ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 200 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 2002). 
 195. Id. at 200. 
 196. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 37. 
 197. Cohen-Eliya, supra note 38, at 274 (“[I]t is common to grant the decision-maker 
margins of appreciation when he acts for the realization of the worthy purpose of national 
security.”). 
 198. SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY 465 
(1994). 
 199. See Makovsky, supra note 11, at 54–56 (stating that the two main purposes of the 
fence were security and to “spur the peace process” by forcing the Palestinians back to 
the negotiating table); see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶¶ 12, 15. In all, the Court ex-
amined eleven different orders by the military commander to construct different segments 
of the fence. Some of these segments only measured five kilometers in length. See Beit 
Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶¶ 17, 49–50, 62, 65, 67, 71–72, 75, 77, 80–81, 86. 
 200. Facts and Figures, supra note 130 (“The Security Fence is a central component in 
Israel’s response to the horrific wave of terrorism emanating from the West Bank. The 
fence is a manifestation of Israel’s basic commitment to defend its citizens. Once com-
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Israeli lives to safeguard the liberties of the Palestinians most affected by 
the fence. By separating the fence into segments, the Court was able to 
examine it in the same manner that it examined home demolitions and 
other military orders. 
There is no doubt that the order to build the security fence was a dras-
tic measure. However, without it, Israel would be forced to continue to 
fight terrorists using guerilla war tactics.201 While the structure of the 
fence is temporary in theory, the objective behind the fence is perma-
nent—lasting security and peace.202 The fact that Israel has been in a 
constant state of emergency since its establishment in 1948203 is proof 
that the previous tools given to the military to secure its citizens were 
reactionary in nature—meant to punish those who committed terrorist 
acts and deter others from supporting terrorism—not to bring about a 
lasting peace.204 Although security appears to be the primary purpose of 
the fence, it is also possible that the government could be forcing its two-
state solution to the current conflict or even trying to create a situation 
that forces the Palestinians into negotiating for peace. Regardless of the 
Justices’ political views, they do not have the expertise or the authority 
to determine whether such policies are correct. As Justice Ben Porat ar-
gued in Barzilai v. Government of Israel: 205 
[I]t cannot be overlooked that those who discharge a clear security 
function find it especially difficult to act always within the law . . . 
Naturally the smaller the deviation from the legal norm, the easier it 
would be to reach the optimal degree of harmony between the law and 
the protection of the State’s security. But we, as judges who dwell 
among our people, should not harbour any illusions, as the events of the 
instant case well illustrate. There simply are cases in which those who 
are at the helm of the State, and bear responsibility for its survival and 
                                                                                                             
pleted, the fence will substantially improve the ability of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and criminal elements into Israel.”) (emphasis re-
moved); see Makovsky, supra note 11, at 55; see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 13. 
 201. See Gross, supra note 24, at 231. 
 202. Both the government of Israel and the Court recognize that the structure of the 
fence is temporary. However, if peace cannot be reached between the two sides, the fence 
will most likely remain in place. Already, the amount of terrorist attacks in areas where 
construction is complete are down significantly. See Makovsky, supra note 11, at 55. 
 203. Bracha, supra note 91. 
 204. Id. at 123. 
 205. HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, 579–80, quoted in 
Bracha, supra note 91. 
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security, regard certain deviations from the law for the sake of protect-
ing the security of the State, as an avoidable necessity.206 
In the case of the security fence, the objectives of stopping terrorism207 
and shifting Israeli policy toward the idea of separation qualify this case 
as an instance where the necessity of building the fence as the govern-
ment sees fit is essential to its overarching goals, and the Court should 
provide the government and military the deference that is necessary for it 
to achieve those goals.208 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. at 125 n.10 (illustrating that the comments made by Justice Ben Porat were not 
shared by the majority of Justices in this particular case. Justice Shamgar, in response to 
Justice Ben Porat stated, “One cannot conceive of a sound administration without main-
tenance of the rule of law, for it is a bulwark against anarchy and ensures the State order. 
This order is essential for the preservation of political and social frameworks and the 
safeguarding of human rights, none of which can flourish in an atmosphere of lawless-
ness.”). 
 207. See Dayan, supra note 9. In a speech regarding the security fence’s ability to stop 
terrorism, Dayan stated: 
There is ample evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of, and precedence 
for, the construction of a security fence. Whenever Israel has needed to provide 
a defensive measure against terrorists for the security of its citizens, it has con-
structed a fence (e.g., along its borders with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). In-
deed, the fence in Gaza has been 100 percent effective in preventing terrorist 
infiltration. Similarly, Stage A of the West Bank fence has already been suc-
cessful, forcing terrorist groups to scramble to move their headquarters to areas 
where there is no fence and greatly decreasing the number of criminal incidents 
along its route. Eventually, this fence will also eliminate the problem of illegal 
Palestinian immigration, which has already resulted in 150,000 illegal residents 
in Israel. 
Id. 
 208. Cf. id. See also Bracha, supra note 91. It should be noted that in most instances, 
providing free reign to the military could lead to drastic and unnecessary results. Conse-
quently, this Note does not argue that the Court should never review military decisions, 
nor that the Court cannot use the proportionality test to weigh the security benefit pro-
vided by a military order versus the negative effect that order poses to the Palestinians; 
rather, this Note asserts that the proper amount of deference must be provided to the 
Court, specifically in the case of the security fence. It is true that 
[i]n a democratic society that loves freedom and security, there is no escape 
from balancing liberty and dignity, and security. Human rights cannot become 
a shovel for negating the security of the public and the state. There must be a 
balance, albeit a difficult and sensitive one, between the individual’s dignity 
and freedom and the state security and public security. 
Gross, supra note 24, at 231. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the past six years, the ongoing cycle of Palestinian 
terrorist attacks and Israeli military excursions into the Occupied Territo-
ries has become commonplace. During this period, known as the Second 
Intifada, Israel implemented forced curfews, border closings, additional 
security at checkpoints, and military operations in an attempt to thwart 
terrorism. Yet, none of these efforts subdued the threat of attack that Is-
raeli citizens struggle with every day.209 Instead of escalating the severity 
of military missions or increasing the frequency of curfews and home 
demolitions, the government and military determined that the time was 
right to change the way Israel approached terrorism and proposed the 
idea of building a security fence that would act as a buffer between Is-
raelis and Palestinians. 
The decision to erect the fence came under immediate scrutiny from 
both Palestinians and much of the international community. Many of the 
concerns and questions surrounding the fence were answered in Beit 
Sourik, the Israeli High Court’s landmark decision in which it ruled that 
while the State of Israel was permitted to build the fence, the fence’s 
route, as chosen by the Ministry of Defense, disproportionately favored 
the security needs of Israel over the fence’s adverse effects on the Pales-
tinians’ quality of life.210 The Court stated that it would take into consid-
eration the military’s belief that the designated route was necessary for 
the security of Israel; however, its decision does not reflect deference to 
the military, but rather, it indicates that the Court used its own judgment 
when concluding that the fence’s route was improperly determined by 
the military.211 
                                                                                                             
 209. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 2. 
 210. See id. ¶ 67. 
 211. In the epilogue of his decision, Chief Justice Barak explains: 
Our task is difficult. We are members of Israeli society. Although we are some-
times in an ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not in-
frequently hit by ruthless terror. We are aware of the killing and destruction 
wrought by the terror against the state and its citizens. As any other Israelis, we 
too recognize the need to defend the country and its citizens against the wounds 
inflicted by terror. We are aware that in the short term, this judgment will not 
make the state’s struggle against those rising up against it easier. But we are 
judges. When we sit in judgment, we are subject to judgment. We act according 
to our best conscience and understanding. Regarding the state’s struggle against 
the terror that rises up against it, we are convinced that at the end of the day, a 
struggle according to the law will strengthen her power and her spirit. There is 
no security without law. Satisfying the provisions of the law is an aspect of na-
tional security. 
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This Note’s assessment that the High Court must provide the military 
with greater deference with regard to its decision surrounding the fence 
is even more pertinent as the Court’s holding in Beit Sourik was rein-
forced in its decision in Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel. In 
Mara’abe, the Court required the Israeli government and military to re-
consider its placement of the security fence near Alfei Menashe, in order 
to minimize the negative effects of the fence on the Palestinians.212 By 
applying the proportionality test in such a way that it lessens the value of 
the military’s opinions and goals, the Court is, in effect, substituting its 
own security beliefs for those of the individuals entrusted with the duty 
to protect Israeli citizens. While allowing the military too much defer-
ence can lead to undesirable results, the uniqueness of the fence as a 
temporary and defensive measure to prevent future terrorist activity in 
Israel should qualify it as an instance in which the Court should have 
provided the military with the utmost deference. 
From a security standpoint, the determination of the fence’s route must 
be based on the best possible course to ensure the safety of Israeli citi-
zens. While the rights and needs of the Palestinians should be taken into 
consideration by the military and government when determining the 
route for the fence, finding a “less restrictive alternative”213 in this par-
ticular instance is not an appropriate determination for the Court to 
make.214 Once the Court established that the military took into account 
the adverse effects the security fence would have on Palestinians, the 
Court should have respected the commander’s discretion.215 Thus, the 
Court’s use of the proportionality test to review the decision to construct 
the  security  fence  was improper because it did not take into account the  
                                                                                                             
Id. ¶ 59. 
 212. Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 116. 
 213. See Bracha, supra note 91; see also Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 69. 
 214. See Gross, supra note 24, at 221–22. 
 215. Beit Sourik, HCJ 2056/04 ¶¶ 44–46. During the process of determining the route 
of the fence, the government stated that “every effort shall be made to minimize, to the 
extent possible, the disturbance to the daily lives of the Palestinians due to the construc-
tion of the obstacle.” Id. 
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expertise of the military when dealing with specific aspects of the fence 
that directly pertain to the security of Israeli lives both present and fu-
ture. 
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